

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

MEMO TO: Timothy J. Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: Timothy Hunt and Rory Rauch, Pantex Site Representatives
DATE: 1 August 2008
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Weekly Report

Static Dissipative Flooring for W76 Operations: B&W Pantex has established a schedule to install static dissipative flooring in the facilities required to support W76 operations in FY09. In addition to the four floors—three bays and one cell—that have already been installed, flooring will be installed in five bays and three cells by the end of first quarter FY09, 2 cells in second quarter FY09, and two bays and one cell in the remainder of FY09. Concurrent with the static dissipative floor installation, B&W Pantex plans to install seismically qualified hoists and complete seismic upgrades to ceiling-mounted appurtenances in certain facilities.

Radiological Alarm Response: Following the activation of the tritium alarm in an operational bay last week, technicians and observers exited the facility and gathered at the nearest muster station, per procedure. The alarm occurred during the normal lunch hour and the muster station was a break/lunch room where smoking was permitted. B&W Pantex is evaluating the appropriateness of assigning a break room as a muster station for radiological alarms. There were no tritium components in the bay at the time of the alarm and Pantex continues to pursue removal of detection equipment from facilities—over union objections—where no source material is anticipated to be present.

End-State Documented Safety Analysis (DSA): Next week, B&W Pantex plans to declare an End-State DSA after it posts and declares effective the final technical safety requirements (TSRs) from the initial set of 10CFR830-compliant DSAs (approved circa April 2003). This milestone and the recent posting of the external explosion analysis represent the completion of time-consuming, resource-intensive efforts to improve the comprehensiveness and maturity of the Pantex safety basis. The next DSA improvement initiative involves the implementation of DOE Standard 1186, *Specific Administrative Controls*.

Specific Administrative Control (SAC) Review: PXSO and B&W Pantex will jointly review the Design, Documentation, Implementation, and Long-Term Maintenance of a representative sample of SACs from August 6-13, 2008. The review is expected to support closure of DNFSB Recommendation 2002-3 by determining the status of remaining commitments from the recommendation. A recent contractor assurance system assessment of the authorization basis implementation of DOE Standard 1186 concluded that much work remains before the standard is fully implemented in all DSAs. Given this observation, it is not clear whether the site will have sufficient implementation by 6 August to allow a sample review indicative of the overall site SAC implementation process approach and practices.

Material Move Occurrences: Since January, 13 failures to move material in accordance with plant guidance and requirements have occurred. This week, another instance of inputting incorrect information into the Move Right system occurred, which prevented the receiving facility from taking custody of the nuclear material. The newly implemented compensatory measure where a manager verifies the move is properly planned before material is dispatched failed in this case. B&W Pantex has begun a causal factors analysis, due to be complete by 22 August, which will evaluate the recent problems experienced during nuclear explosive, nuclear material, and high explosive moves.